1. Executive Summary: The Rust-Based MedusaLocker3 Threat

The ransomware landscape is currently undergoing a massive architectural evolution, with veteran syndicates migrating away from legacy frameworks to modern, cross-platform languages. Discovered actively targeting enterprise environments throughout 2026, the .cheche variant series (e.g., .cheche30, .cheche50, .cheche70, .cheche100) represents a highly sophisticated iteration of the MedusaLocker3 (Version 5 / FarAttack) family. Entirely rewritten in Rust, this variant is engineered for maximum execution speed, deep evasion of traditional antivirus signatures, and catastrophic disruption of critical database infrastructure.

Upon breaching a corporate network—typically via exposed RDP ports—the MedusaLocker3 payload rapidly traverses local drives, mapped network shares, and centralized storage. It explicitly halts active database services to unlock the files and encrypts mission-critical data. A primary database originally named inventory.mdf is instantly rendered useless as inventory.mdf.cheche50.

A distinct forensic marker of these newer Rust-based MedusaLocker variants is the replacement of original file headers with the hexadecimal signature 52 41 57 52 (ASCII “RAWR”). This header replacement severely complicates standard data recovery efforts. The attackers utilize a strict double-extortion model, exfiltrating sensitive corporate data prior to encryption and threatening to leak it online if a ransom is not paid within a 72-hour window. This playbook provides IT administrators, database administrators (DBAs), and incident responders with a clear roadmap to contain the active breach, evaluate the “RAWR” header damage, and navigate the high-stakes extortion threat orchestrated via offshore email services like salamati.vip.

2. Threat Intelligence & Technical Specifications

To successfully counter a MedusaLocker3 deployment, defenders must understand the adversary’s technical footprint. The shift to Rust makes the binary highly resistant to traditional reverse engineering and significantly accelerates the encryption process via intermittent chunking.

3. Anatomy of a Database Attack (The Kill Chain)

A MedusaLocker3 infection targeting a database server is rarely accidental; operators specifically hunt for high-value targets to maximize their extortion leverage.

4. The Complete Ransom Note Analysis

During an active incident, the READ_NOTE.html file is a vital piece of forensic evidence. Based on incident response telemetry, below is the reconstructed text typically found in the ransom note left by the MedusaLocker3 operators.

YOUR PERSONAL ID: [SNIPED] /!\ YOUR COMPANY NETWORK HAS BEEN PENETRATED /!\ All your important files have been encrypted! Your files are safe! Only modified. (RSA+AES) ANY ATTEMPT TO RESTORE YOUR FILES WITH THIRD-PARTY SOFTWARE WILL PERMANENTLY CORRUPT IT. DO NOT MODIFY ENCRYPTED FILES. DO NOT RENAME ENCRYPTED FILES. No software available on internet can help you. We are the only ones able to solve your problem. We gathered highly confidential/personal data. These data are currently stored on a private server. This server will be immediately destroyed after your payment. If you decide to not pay, we will release your data to public or re-seller. So you can expect your data to be publicly available in the near future.. Contact us for price and get decryption software. email: [email protected] [email protected] – To contact us, create a new free email account on the site: protonmail.com IF YOU DON’T CONTACT US WITHIN 72 HOURS, PRICE WILL BE HIGHER. – Tor-chat to always be in touch: qd7pcafncosqfqu3ha6fcx4h6sr7tzwagzpcdcnytiw3b6varaeqv5yd.onion

5. Phase 1: Detection & Threat Hunting

Security teams must sweep the environment for the .cheche extension family, the specific HTML ransom notes, and audit the status of the VSS and SQL services.

Actionable PowerShell Threat Hunt

Deploy this PowerShell script via your centralized management console (e.g., SCCM or EDR Live Response) to audit servers for MedusaLocker3 indicators:

# ==============================================================================
# Decryptors.org Incident Response Script: MedusaLocker3 (.cheche) Audit
# Target: Windows Servers / SQL Environments (Run as Administrator)
# ==============================================================================

Write-Host "Starting MedusaLocker3 Network Audit..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

$infectionFound = $false

# 1. Check for encrypted file extensions targeting SQL and user directories
$testPaths = @("C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server", "$env:USERPROFILE\Documents", "D:\Data")

foreach ($path in $testPaths) {
    if (Test-Path $path) {
        # Catching the .cheche family (e.g., .cheche30, .cheche50)
        $files = Get-ChildItem -Path $path -Filter "*.cheche*" -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
        if ($files.Count -gt 0) {
            Write-Warning "[!] CRITICAL: Encrypted .cheche files detected in $path"
            $infectionFound = $true
        }
    }
}

# 2. Check for the presence of the specific ransom note
$ransomNotes = Get-ChildItem -Path C:\ -Filter "READ_NOTE.html" -Recurse -Depth 4 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

if ($ransomNotes) {
    Write-Warning "[!] CRITICAL: MedusaLocker ransom note (READ_NOTE.html) discovered."
    $infectionFound = $true
}

# 3. Check the status of the Volume Shadow Copy (VSS) Service
try {
    $vssService = Get-Service -Name VSS -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    if ($vssService.Status -eq 'Stopped' -and $vssService.StartType -eq 'Disabled') {
        Write-Warning "[!] CRITICAL: Volume Shadow Copy service (VSS) has been explicitly disabled!"
        Write-Warning "This is a primary indicator of defense evasion by the threat actors."
    }
} catch {
    Write-Output "[i] Could not verify VSS service state."
}

if ($infectionFound) {
    Write-Warning ">>> IMMEDIATE SERVER ISOLATION REQUIRED. DO NOT REBOOT. <<<"
} else {
    Write-Output "[i] No immediate signs of MedusaLocker3 infection on this endpoint."
}

7. Phase 3: SQL Server Database Triage & Recovery

Recovering from a database-centric ransomware attack with no available backups requires highly specialized techniques. Standard file recovery does not apply to complex relational databases whose headers have been overwritten with the "RAWR" signature.

Method 1: Forensic Database Repair (Partial Encryption Extraction)

To maximize operational speed, the Rust engine employs intermittent encryption (chunking) on large files. For massive targets like SQL databases, it encrypts a specific block of data (e.g., 750 KB) and then skips a block (e.g., 250 KB). While the file header is destroyed (replaced by 52 41 57 52 02 02), massive portions of the underlying data are mathematically pristine.

• Do Not Use Standard Repair Tools: Running standard Windows file repair tools (or `DBCC CHECKDB` on a renamed file) will fail entirely because the SQL engine cannot read the "RAWR" magic bytes.
• Forensic Data Carving (B-tree Reconstruction): Specialized SQL database repair experts can deploy proprietary bit-level carving tools that bypass the attacker’s key entirely. They scan unallocated storage sectors, parse internal SQL Server database page headers (B-tree structures), and reassemble undamaged database extents, extracting tabular records directly into clean database instances without paying the ransom.

Method 2: Cryptographic Response & Handling Extortion

If forensic data carving yields insufficient data (e.g., the ransomware encrypted a high percentage of the file blocks), engaging the threat actors is the only remaining option to retrieve the master private session key.

Never negotiate alone. Allow professional incident response firms to handle communication with [email protected]. They will:

• Utilize the "2-3 free test files" offer to definitively prove the attacker holds the working key.
• Negotiate the ransom demand down significantly from the initial asking price.
• Verify the provided decryptor executable in a secure sandbox to ensure it does not contain secondary malware payloads before running it on your cloned data.

8. Phase 4: Post-Incident Hardening & Server Resilience

Surviving a MedusaLocker3 attack without backups is a catastrophic operational event. The response to this infection must serve as a mandate for a comprehensive enterprise security overhaul. Recovery without hardening is temporary.

• Eradicate Public RDP Exposure (Do Immediately): Remote Desktop Protocol (TCP 3389) must never face the public internet. This is the primary entry point for MedusaLocker affiliates. Access to the environment must require a VPN protected by strict multi-factor authentication (MFA).
• Audit Domain Admins (Do Immediately): Audit Active Directory and rotate all Domain Administrator passwords.
• Implement Immutable Storage Vaults (Within 30 Days): You must deploy a modern Veeam 3-2-1-1 backup structure incorporating air-gapped, WORM immutable repositories (such as Linux Hardened Repositories). Immutable storage guarantees that once backup data is written, it cannot be modified, encrypted, or deleted—even if an attacker explicitly disables the VSS service.
• Deploy Endpoint Detection and Response (Within 30 Days): Deploy behavioral EDR platforms with anti-tamper protections, configured to flag and block mass VSS deletion commands.

The MedusaLocker3 (.cheche) ransomware represents a highly destructive, Rust-based threat focused explicitly on critical database infrastructure, rapid intermittent encryption, and double-extortion. Navigating a zero-backup crisis requires a cool head, adherence to strict incident response frameworks, and specialized forensic database triage. Should this playbook highlight gaps in your current defensive posture, treat it as a mandate to immediately overhaul your enterprise IT architecture.